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¿A quién escucha Bolsonaro en contexto de emergencia? Construyendo un marco 
analítico para el estudio de las redes informales de asesoría presidencial durante 
la pandemia de Covid-19 en Brasil
Aglaé Isadora Tumelero2
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brasil
RESUMEN A pesar de las evidencias sobre los asesores informales de los pre-
sidentes en América Latina, la literatura sobre el tema aún es incipiente. Este 
artículo investiga el escenario informativo que rodeó al presidente brasileño, 
Jair Bolsonaro, de enero a abril de 2020, un período de toma de decisiones 
presidenciales sobre las medidas para combatir la pandemia de Covid-19. Para 
eso, se realiza un estudio de caso de las interacciones establecidas por el presi-
dente brasileño basado en los registros de la Agenda del Presidente. Se utilizan 
herramientas de análisis de redes sociales (SNA) para examinar las evidencias. 
Los resultados indican que el Ministerio de Salud no fue el principal canal de 
información del presidente al princípio de la pandemia a pesar de su papel cen-
tral en la estructura de gobernanza nacional de emergencia em salud pública. 
Además, revelan la elección del presidente de utilizar la presidencia como su 
principal soporte informativo, incluso fortaleciéndolo a través de sus poderes 
__________________________
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preference on presidential information strategies in Latin America. E-mail: aglaeisadora@c-pol.
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administrativos unilaterales. Finalmente, no hay evidencia de que el Presiden-
te combinara el asesoramiento formal e informal como estrategia de acceso 
a la información alternativa al Ministerio de Salud, resultados que deben ser 
sopesados considerando el carácter parcialmente confiable de la Agenda del 
Presidente como fuente de evidencia relacional. El estudio ofrece un marco 
conceptual y metodológico para identificar y medir la estrategia de asesoría 
informal de los presidentes brasileños, contribuyendo al avance teórico y me-
todológico de la investigación sobre el tema en América Latina.
PALABRAS CLAVE Redes Informales; Asesoría Presidencial; Poder Ejecutivo; 
Covid-19; Brasil.
ABSTRACT Despite evidence about the informal advisors of the presidents in 
Latin America, literature on this topic is still incipient. This article investigates 
the informational scenario that surrounded the Brazilian president, Jair Bolso-
naro, from January to April 2020, a period of presidential decision-making on 
the measures to face the Covid-19 pandemic. In-depth case study of interac-
tions established by the Brazilian president is developed based on data from 
the Brazilian President’s Daily Diary. Social Network Analysis (SNA) tools are 
used to analyze this evidence. The findings suggest that the Ministry of Health 
(MOH) was not the main information channel for the president at the begin-
ning of the pandemic despite its central role in the national governance structu-
re of public health emergencies. In addition, the analysis shows the president's 
choice to use the structures of the Presidency as main informational support, 
including strengthening them through unilateral administrative measures. Fi-
nally, the results indicate that there is no evidence that the president combined 
formal and informal advisory as a strategy to access alternative information to 
the MOH. The findings should be pondered regarding the partly reliable nature 
of the President’s Daily Diary as a source of relational data. The study provides 
a conceptual and methodological framework to identify and measure the pre-
sidential informal advisory strategy, contributing to the advance of research on 
presidential advising in Latin America.
KEYWORDS Informal Networks; Presidential Advisory; Executive Branch; Co-
vid-19; Brazil.
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1. Introduction
Literature on institutional presidency in Latin America has focused on a set of tools 
available to presidents to solve the informational challenges made by multiparty 
government dynamics. Special emphasis has been given to the tools derived from 
the formal powers of the presidents, especially the administrative and appointment 
powers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that informal strategies, such as informal advi-
sory networks, also help the presidents of the region to solve the informational cha-
llenges and strengthen their leadership skills. However, there are few studies of the 
topic and even fewer methodological and conceptual discussions of how to identify 
and measure informal advisory networks.
This article seeks to answer the following research question: How to measure 
informal presidential advisory strategy? Based on the previous research agenda as 
a logical point of departure, the article offers a conceptual and methodological fra-
mework to identify and measure the informal presidential advisory strategy. First, 
informal advisory strategy is defined here as the network of relationships established 
informally by the presidents with external actors in the public administration as a 
means of accessing and controlling information. Second, four indicators are proposed 
to measure it: (1) the type of meeting, (2) the organizational affiliation of the network 
actors, (3) the actors ‘professional background, and, finally (4) the temporal prece-
dence of meetings regarding the decisions and positions adopted by the Presidents. 
To shed lights on this issue, a case study of the Brazilian president interactions 
from January to April 2020 is carried out. This period presents an accentuated epi-
sode of intra-executive conflict between the president and the head of the Ministry 
of Health (MOH) on the responses to face the pandemic. Using evidence from the 
Brazilian President’s Daily Diary, 484 interactions involving the president are analy-
zed and the president’s relational ties with civil society actors are examined using the 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) tools.
The findings suggest that, at least in the initial period of pandemic in Brazil, the 
presidency structures, especially the Civil House, the Government Secretariat and 
the Presidency Secretariat, were the main informational support of the president, pla-
ying a central role in the presidential advisory network. Moreover, the study suggests 
that the conflict of preference within the cabinet in the context of the national emer-
gency was not enough incentive for the adoption of an informal advisory network.
The article contributes to the methodological and theoretical discussions on in-
formal presidential advising in Latin America. It is organized in five different and 
special sections not including this one. It begins with a brief literature review on for-
mal and informal presidential information strategy. It goes on to provide a discus-
sion of case selection and the chronology of events of the period, followed by a brief 
methodological discussion on the sources of evidence used in research on presiden-
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tial advisory and the analytical tools used to analyze them. This section is followed by 
in-depth case study of interactions established by the Brazilian president in the first 
four months of the Covid-19 pandemic in this country. The conclusion reports the 
study’s findings and contributions.
2. Literature Review
The access of information is a fundamental element for presidential decision making. 
In political philosophy, the discussion on the art of being informed and advised has 
a long history3. The information is considered the vital force of decision making and 
constitutes the essential need of leaders4. “Information is power because it is the subs-
tance of which decisions are made”5. Even experienced leaders cannot be specialists 
in everything, and therefore, they depend on information and advice, constantly nee-
ding assistance to gain information and how to use it6.
The control of information is also an important element for presidents in their 
efforts to promote governability; that is, the capacity to manage and control the state. 
It is through information control that presidents are able to exercise their legislative 
powers, increase political influence, reduce uncertainty and control the negotiating 
environment within the government, ensuring that their decisions are implemented7. 
Control of information provides them capacity for effective leadership.
Controlling information, in turn, requires strategy. The literature on institutional 
presidency points out that the leaders of presidential governments have at their dis-
posal powers that allows them to obtain access and control of information through 
structural choices, particularly administrative and appointment powers8. The poli-
ticization and centralization are the main formal strategies to reach full control of 
information.
Politicization refers to the practice of placing loyal, partisan or ideologically com-
patible political appointees in bureaucratic positions of ministries, agencies and de-
partments of the Executive Branch in order to control information related to poli-
cies9. “The central idea is to ensure that important bureaucratic decisions are made by 
presidential agents, or at least are directly overseen and monitored by them”10.
__________________________
3. GOLDHAMER (1978); MELTSNER (1990); MAQUIAVEL (2013).
4. NEUSTADT (1991); KOWERT (2002).
5. WITHERSPOON (1991) p. 149.
6. THOMAS (1970); KOWERT (2002).
7. MOE (1993).
8. MOE (1985, 1993, 2000); RUDALEVIGE (2002); LEWIS (2003); RUDALEVIGE y LEWIS (2005); 
INÁCIO y LLANOS (2016).
9. MOE (1993).
10. MOE (1993) p. 370.
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Centralization is based on limiting the discretionary power of executive minis-
tries or agencies and transferring decision making power to the President, which can 
be done by transferring agencies responsible for important decisions and policies to 
the Presidency, removing them from the authority of ministers or agencies. Besides, 
another way to centralize is to create political structures within the Presidency, in-
corporating people from other departments and agencies, and pulling highly salient 
policy issues to the presidency for consideration, debate and resolution11.
Literature on institutional presidency has found that structures to control infor-
mation created at the Presidency are heterogeneous. In the United States, presidents 
from Hoover to Nixon, for example, adopted different structural patterns: public 
commissions, task forces, and conferences, all of which operated for a limited time 
period, and permanent advisory bodies, such as the Council of Economic Advisers 
(CEA) and the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), which are positio-
ned in the Executive Office of the President (EOP)12.
Centralization is also used by Latin American presidents. Research shows that 
the quantity of structures created at the Presidency has oscillated among countries 
of the region since democratic transition. While Paraguay and Uruguay show a linear 
movement of expansion in the number of these structures, other countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico show a nonlinear movement marked by de-
clines and increases13.
Still, the type of structures centralized at Presidency vary in the region. INÁCIO 
(2013) classified these structures into three groups: core, advisory, and policy. The 
core structures comprise the units responsible for conducting, within the scope of the 
presidency, the activities of coordination, monitoring and integration of government 
actions, at different levels: legal, administrative and institutional, including internal 
and external coordination. The advisory structure is oriented towards the formula-
tion of policies and strategic agendas. In turn, the policy structure is responsible for 
formulating and implementing specific policies14. 
Research also points out that the number of each type of structure also varies15. 
Between 1984 and 2010, for example, the Argentine Presidency was internally not so 
diversified oscillating only between core and policy structures. In the same period, 
in turn, the Brazilian Presidency presented core, policy and advisory structures16. Es-
pecially the expansion of advisory structures was markedly a non-linear process in 
Brazil from 1990 to 2019 as figure 1 shows.
__________________________
11. MOE (1993) p. 371.
12. THOMAS (1970).
13. INÁCIO y LLANOS (2016).
14. INÁCIO (2013). 
15. INÁCIO y LLANOS (2015).
16. INÁCIO y LLANOS (2015).
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Figure 1.  Advisory structures centralized at the Presidency of Brazil (1990-2019).
Source: Prepared by author.
Centralization and politicization are possible due to formal powers of presidents, 
especially their administrative and appointment authority. These powers allow pre-
sidents (by their own choice) to make important structural choices without going 
through the legislative process, altering the dynamics of institutional change and 
fashion a system more to their liking. It is through these powers that U.S. and La-
tin American presidents can organize and direct the Presidency as they see fit, crea-
ting structures, reorganizing them, moving them, coordinating them, imposing ru-
les about their behavior, and putting their own people in top positions17. Thus, these 
formal powers are incentives and institutional opportunities for presidents to create 
their own context, increasing their leadership capacity18.
The presidents may secure control of information and promote governability in 
another way, particularly by mobilizing an informal network of aides19. This informa-
tion strategy receives different terms in different countries. In the United States, it has 
been called ‘inner-circle’, ‘kitchen cabinets’ and ‘invisible presidency’. In turn, ‘Círculo 
de Hierro’ and ‘Segundo Piso’ in Chile. The main goal of this strategy is to provide “the 
President with broad gauge advice on critical policy choices that is unrestrained by 
departmental, agency, or pressure group interests”20.
In Latin America, the use of formal powers and informal advisory networks by 
the presidents to access information is associated with the challenges that the dyna-
mics of multiparty governments pose for the principal-agent relationship. Particu-
larly in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay, centralization 
__________________________
17. MOE (1993); MOE y CALDWELL (1994).
18. MOE (1993; 2009). 
19. THOMAS (1970); LINK y KEGLEY (1993); MÉNDEZ (2007); SIAVELIS (2016).
20. THOMAS (1970) p. 561.
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is encouraged by the number of parties in the cabinet and the heterogeneity of pre-
ferences between them21. The mentioned factors complicate the delegation between 
the president and the ministers (agents), and expose presidents to greater chances of 
agency losses, especially moral hazard22. To avoid agency losses, presidents centralize 
decision making and other tasks within the presidency. Through this strategy, pre-
sidents expand their legislative and appointment powers, protect themselves from 
cross-party consultation, and increase their policy influence23.
In turn, research on Chile politics points out that multiparty power sharing arran-
gements provide incentives for the mobilization of informal advisory networks24. 
These arrangements, when driven by a set of challenging rules such as age, expertise, 
gender, proportionality and transversality, limit the presidential appointments, and 
encourage presidents to rely on advisers outside the ministries and the presidency. 
Thus, “the informal advisory networks are the way presidents balance portfolio sha-
ring with their need for information and advice”25.
2.1 Defining presidential informal advisory networks
Literature on presidency shows two definitions for this strategy. First, as informal 
interactions that presidents establish with a small number of formal advisers (who 
hold positions in the ministries and agencies of the Executive Branch) and personal 
friends. These interactions occur in ad hoc meetings, as well as in semi-formal gathe-
rings like working breakfasts or lunches26. Second, as an informal advisory network 
that is kaleidoscopic, that is, whose pattern of interaction and composition changes 
continuously. This network consists on presidents and members that can be indivi-
duals serving in or outside of the cabinets, in other presidential offices, or be comple-
tely informal advisers with no statutory or formal appointment27.
Joining this previous research agenda, is presented here a concept of informal ad-
visory strategy from the following three analytical attributes: (1) relational choices, 
(2) non-regulation by legal measures and (3) network structure. For this reason, the 
informal advisory strategy refers to the network of relationships established by the 
presidents with small group of actors, who are external to government, as a means of 
accessing and controlling information. These interactions are not regulated by a legal 
__________________________
21. BATISTA (2013); GAYLORD y RENNÓ (2015); INÁCIO y LLANOS (2016).
22. Moral hazard is a post-contractual opportunistic behavior, in which agents (here ministers) take 
advantage of the information asymmetry, acting for their own benefit or that of their group at the 
expense of the principal's preferences (here presidents) MOE (1985); RUDALEVIGE (2002).
23. INÁCIO y LLANOS (2016).
24. SIAVELIS (2014; 2016).
25. SIAVELIS (2016) p. 02.
26. THOMAS (1970); LINK (2002).
27. SIAVELIS (2016).
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provision and the network is constantly changing, with relationships being activated 
and deactivated at any time.
While centralization and politicization involve structural choices by presidents 
about which structures to create and which positions to politicize in order to control 
information, the informal advisory strategy involves choosing who to listen to, who 
to-relate-to and who to allow access to. I consider it a relational choice, because it re-
fers to the set of actors that the presidents choose to relate in order to access relevant 
information for decision making process.
The choice of the set of actors to listen to and the informational function they 
perform does not become a written and sanctioned rule within official channels, 
although it is socially shared and communicated within those channels. Thus, while 
centralization and politicization have functions and rules written and sanctioned in 
these channels, being possible to identify them through formal measures, the infor-
mal advisory strategy is not regulated by written rules. This means that the aides' 
advisory role and their relationship with the president is informal28.
The structure underlying the informal advisory strategy is a network, that is, a set 
of specific relationships between a finite set of actors29. The set of relationships in this 
network are advisory relationships and its actors are those selected by the presidents. 
These relationships operate as a channel for transferring and exchanging information 
- a fundamental immaterial resource for decision making and governability.
Identifying and measuring informal strategies is not simple - “identify, measure 
and compare the rules of the game that are not written and, in many cases, hidden 
from the public”30. Similarly, advisory networks are not explicit, neither written. In-
formal advisors do not provide information to presidents through memos or writ-
ten reports that can be tracked, but through physical or virtual interactions in small 
groups that are not regulated by a legal provision. 
Literature on informal advisory networks in Latin America is incipient, not pre-
senting accumulated theoretical and methodological development. Thus, this article 
offers a contribution by building a methodological framework to identify and mea-
sure it. In order to explain this point, the empirical strategy adopted is a case study 
of Brazil in the first four months of the Covid-19 outbreak. The following sections set 
out this analytical way.
3. Case selection 
The close examination of Brazil over a four-month period (January-April 2020) 
offers an interesting opportunity to study presidential information strategy. First, 
the period of analysis encompasses the beginning of the coronavirus’ outbreak in the 
__________________________
28. HELMKE y LEVITSKY (2006).
29. WASSERMAN y FAUST (1994).
30. HELMKE y LEVITSKY (2006) p. 04.
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country and the first government’s responses to it, which included measures of social 
distancing, quarantine and different treatments of the disease, particularly the guide-
lines for the use of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine.
Second, the period is marked by repeated conflicts between the position of the 
MOH and the Presidency on the content of these measures. The dismissal of the 
Health Minister, Luiz Henrique Mandetta, in the mid-April highlights the end of this 
conflict. The dismissal also resulted in an administrative discontinuity of the manage-
ment of health emergency.
The case presents an accentuated episode of intra-executive conflict combined 
with Bolsonaro’s refusal to make the MOH his main source of advice in decision-
making during a severe health emergency. Based on literature on presidency, it is 
expected that these conditions produce incentives to the mobilization of an informal 
advisory network by the president. This section presents the main events and deci-
sions that marked the period. The figure 2 shows the chronology of events.
Figure 2. Chronology of the responses by Brazilian Government from January to 
April, 202031.
Source: Prepared by author.
__________________________
31. Figure 2 can be seen interactively here: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.14740818.v1.
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__________________________
32. Portaria 188, de 2020.
33. Decreto 7.616, de 2011 y Portaria 2.952, de 2011.
34. Portaria 2.952, de 2011. 
35. The PRESP, approved in 2014, provides guidelines for the actions of SVS and MOH in the face of 
public health emergencies. Together with the National Policy for Civil Defense and Protection, ap-
proved in 2012, it is part of the national structure governance of disasters Ley 12.608, 2012; Ministé-
rio da Saúde, 2014. This structure internalizes the international commitments agreed by Brazil with 
World Health Organization (WHO), particularly International Health Regulations (IHR) RODRI-
GUES, CARPES y RAFFAGNATO, 2020.
36. RODRIGUES et al. (2020).
37. CRODA y GARCIA (2020).
38. By Ordinance No. 74, 2020 of the National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA).
39. By Decree No. 10.211, 2020.
On February 3, the State of Public Health Emergency of National Importance (ES-
PIN) was declared by the Health Minister, four days later the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) declares the outbreak of Covid-19 as an International Public Health 
Emergency (ESPII)32.
The ESPIN can be declared only by an act of the Health Minister after requisition 
of the Secretary of Health Surveillance or, in the event of a disaster, by the Integration 
National Minister33. For its declaration, it is also necessary to present to MOH a tech-
nical report with information on the risk of spreading the disease, level of severity of 
the emergency, rates of morbidity, lethality and contamination and a description of 
the environmental aspects of the event34. 
Briefly, prior declaring the ESPIN, a series of monitoring measures of the Covid-19 
outbreak were taken by the MOH and the National Secretariat of Sanitary Survei-
llance (SVS). In particular, seven measures foreseen in the Public Health Emergen-
cy Response Plan (PRESP) were adopted35. The first of them was the requisition for 
a “rumor check” about the disease in China by Center for Strategic Information in 
Health Surveillance (CIEVS)36. The second measure was the triggering of the Event 
Monitoring Committee (CME) to monitor the outbreak of Covid-19 in China, after 
confirmation of a new virus on January 1037. The third was the publication of the first 
SVS Epidemiological Bulletin with information about the new disease. The fourth 
measure was the activation of the Public Health Emergency Operations Center for 
the New Coronavirus (COE-nCoV) for alert level I.  The fifth was the change of COE-
nCoV in national alert level from I to II after confirmation of the first suspected case 
of infection in Brazil. In addition, the Public Health Emergency Group was created 
to conduct the actions related to the new coronavirus38. Finally, the creation of the 
Inter-ministerial Executive Group on Public Health Emergency of International Im-
portance (GEI-ESPII)39.
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__________________________
40. BRASIL. Ministério da Saúde. Protocolo de Tratamento do Novo Coronavírus (2019-nCoV).
41. Available in: https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/pronunciamentos/pro-
nunciamentos-do-presidente-da-republica/pronunciamento-do-senhor-presidente-da-republica-
jair-bolsonaro-em-cadeia-de-radio-e-televisao-3 [Date of access: 10/01/2021].
42. Decreto 10.277, de 2020.
43. STARGARDTER y EISENHAMMER (2020).
After ESPIN, the Health Minister sent to the National Congress a Bill of Law pro-
viding sanitary measures to combat the outbreak, such as social distancing and qua-
rantine, and the eventual closure of ports, highways and airports for entering and 
leaving the country. On February 5th, the bill was voted by the National Congress, 
becoming the Law 13.979/2020 (namely Lei da Quarentena). Also, the first case of 
local transmission of the virus was confirmed, inaugurating a new phase of the emer-
gency management cycle in Brazil - MOH published the treatment protocol for the 
new coronavirus on February 2640.
Throughout January and February, while the MOH and their specialized bureau-
cracies followed international recommendations and protocols in the initial pandemic 
response, the President made repeated public statements minimizing the magnitude 
of the situation and criticizing the social distancing measures to contain the virus 
contamination curve. From January to March, the president announced twenty-seven 
public statements attenuating the risks of the new coronavirus and criticizing the so-
cial distancing measures. In particular, his official statement in the national radio and 
television networks consolidated the conflict between the MOH recommendations 
and the Presidency's position41.
The conflict between the MOH and the Presidency reached new dimensions with 
the unilateral measures issued by the president Bolsonaro on March, 2020. The first 
of them was the centralization of the Crisis Committee for Supervision and Monito-
ring of the Impacts of Covid-19. This was an advisory structure subordinated directly 
to the Presidency and not foreseen in the Brazilian disaster governance structure. Its 
original purpose was to articulate government action and advising the President on 
issues related to pandemic - a president strategy to monitoring MOH42. Three months 
later, the Committee gained decision rights, such as to deliberate on priorities, guide-
lines and strategic aspects of tacking the Covid-19. This change resulted in the emp-
tying of the MOH decision rights43.
The second unilateral measure of the president was the Provisional Measure 
926/2020 (MP).  The MP established as exclusive right of Federal government to le-
gislate on social distancing and quarantine measures, modifying the article 3 of the 
Lei da Quarentena. The MP was a reaction of the President Bolsonaro to the tighte-
ning of social distancing measures adopted by the subnational governments. Faced 
with the expressive increase in the rate of infection and deaths from Covid-19, the 
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governors of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro states followed the guidelines of the MOH 
and closed public school system, as well the operation of shopping malls, gyms, and 
in person attendance at commercial establishments. The MP generated a reaction 
of governors and mayors, who did not follow through. Also, the MP was questioned 
in Direct Constitutionality Action (ADI 6.341/2020) in the Federal Supreme Court 
(STF). On April 16, 2020 the Court reaffirmed the shared competence of national and 
subnational governments in tackling the pandemic, which represented a setback for 
President Bolsonaro.
The intra-executive conflict between the President and the head of MOH intensi-
fied with the publication of the treatment protocol for the new coronavirus by MOH, 
providing guidance on the prescription of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine in 
the treatment of severe cases of Covid-1944. The publication occurred six days after 
the declaration of the state of community transmission of the virus in Brazil. The 
MOH protocol was based in WHO recommendations for the use of the medicine, 
which displeased the presidency. President Bolsonaro has been defending the wides-
pread use of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine, especially in the treatment of mild 
cases of Covid-19. The disagreement culminated in the dismissal of the Health Mi-
nister, Luiz Henrique Mandetta, and the National Secretary of Sanitary Surveillance, 
Wanderson de Oliveira in mid-April.
Brazil is an exceptional case of intra-executive conflict marked by divergences 
between the presidency and the portfolio in charge of public health emergency ma-
nagement. Despite MOH leading the outbreak response, monitoring its evolution in 
Brazil and the world since the beginning of the outbreak, it was not mobilized as the 
main information channel by President Bolsonaro. So, the Brazilian president's be-
havior raises the questions: who did the president listen to in decision making about 
social distancing measures and the protocol for the use of chloroquine and hydroxy-
chloroquine? What were his sources of information? 
Thus, regarding the chronology of the events and the literature on the topic, my 
argument is that the period from January to April offers a fertile ground for the mo-
bilization of informal advisory network by the president Bolsonaro. In other words, 
seeking to reduce the bias of the MOH information, the president would have incenti-
ves to invest in an informal advisory strategy, which would provide him an alternative 
channel for transferring and exchanging information about the Covid-19 outbreak.
__________________________
44. BRASIL. Ministério da Saúde. Nota Informativa No. 5/2020. Uso da Cloroquina como terapia 
adjuvante no tratamento de formas graves do COVID-19.
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4. Data and measure 
Studies on presidents’ interaction with their aides usually relies on three sources 
of evidence: data from official schedules of the President's Daily Diaries45 and press 
and interview data46.
The first source of evidence is used in studies on the U.S. presidency. Maintained 
by the National Archives, the official schedules of the Presidents’ Daily Diaries list on 
a minute-by-minute basis nearly all of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford 
and Carter presidents' contacts with other individuals, including both telephone con-
versations and in-person meetings. These notes provide researchers with six essential 
information: occurrence, date, duration and generally the type of meeting, in addition 
to a list of the number and identity of those present47.
Social network analysis has been used to analyze the evidence about president-
advisor interactions from official schedules of the Presidents’ Daily Diaries48. LINK 
(2002) argues that “relationships between a president and his advisers can be viewed 
as a kaleidoscopic network of individuals in that they are complex and varied”49. The 
author also points out that Presidents’ Daily Diaries are a detailed source for analyzing 
presidential networks. Thus, using the SNA measures, he explores the variation in the 
size of the network of advisors from Carter to Nixon, who were the advisors who 
interacted most with each president, as well as the turnover of actors in the advisory 
network of these presidents50.
__________________________
45. THOMPSON (1990a, 1990b, 1990c); BEST (1988, 1992); SIGELMAN y MCNEIL (1980); LINK 
y KEGLEY (1993); LINK (2002).
46. ARANA (2012); SIAVELIS (2016).
47. LINK y KEGLEY (1993).
48. In addition, several studies have relied on descriptive measures to analyze the pattern of interac-
tion between U.S. presidents and their advisers, which have focused on: the number of times par-
ticular senior members of Carter's White House staff participated in group or one-on-one meetings 
with president, the total amount of time spent in these interactions THOMPSON (1990a, 1990b, 
1990c), the simple frequency of interactions between president Johnson and his foreign policy ad-
visers during Tet crisis, the last average, in minutes, of all the interactions during this crisis SIGEL-
MAN y MCNEIL (1980); BEST (1988, 1992), the quantity of instances or occurrences of advisers 
meeting with president Carter, and the time adjusted (indexing the total time to a standardized 
measure based on the total number of people attending these meetings) LINK y KEGLEY (1993).
49. LINK (2002) p. 237.
50. LINK (2002).
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The second source of evidence, that is, press and interview data, is used for resear-
ching purposes on the interaction between Latin American presidents and their ad-
visors. This evidence was analyzed based on theoretically grounded case study51 and 
content analysis52. By theoretically grounded case, study compare the composition of 
the advisory network of Chilean presidents between the administrations of Patricio 
Aylwin53, Eduardo Frei, Ricardo Lagos and Michele Bachelet. By content analysis, stu-
dies analyze the response of twenty-one former Latin American presidents from eight 
countries to the question: “Suppose you want to make a decision, but you don't have 
all the background you would like to make an informed decision, what would you do? 
Would you follow your instincts, ask for advice, or refrain from making a decision?”54.
Based on these previous studies, the Brazilian President’s Daily Diary is used as a 
source of evidence about informal interaction president-advisors. This source provi-
des well documented relational data, publicly available, ensuring replicability55. Par-
ticularly, it presents five kinds of information: type of meeting, usually a list of the 
identity of those present, local, date and time56.
It is important to clarify that the data from Brazilian President’s Daily Diary is 
limited. First, phone calls or emails exchanged between the president and his aides 
are not recorded on the official schedule. Second, scheduled meetings that, for wha-
tever reason, did not happen are not registered as “cancelled” or “suspended” on the 
schedule, but they are deleted of it. Finally, the schedule is coordinated by Gabinete 
Pessoal do Presidente57, which is formed by loyal agents of him. Hence, presidents 






54. ARANA (2012) p. 36.
55. Data were collected in Brazilian Government Open Data Portal: http://dadosabertos.presiden-
cia.gov.br/dataset/agendas-presidenciais-2020. 
56. Supplemental material for this paper is available here: https://figshare.com/projects/Who_
does_Bolsonaro_listen_to_under_emergency_conditions_Building_a_framework_for_analyzing_
informal_presidential_advisory_networks_during_the_Covid-19_pandemic_in_Brazil/99449.
57. This function is regulated by Law 13.844, 2019. 
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Table 1. Excerpts from President Bolsonaro's Daily Diary of Activities (April 17, 2020).
Local To From Activity
Brasília 09:00 10:00 Braga Neto Civil House Minister 
Luiz Eduardo Ramos Government Secretariat Minister
Brasília 11:00 12:00 Inauguration Ceremony of Mr. Nelson Luiz Sperle Teich
Brasília 14:10 14:40 Wagner Rosário Comptroller General of the Union Minister
Brasília 15:10 15:40 Braga Neto Civil House Minister 
Luiz Eduardo Ramos Government Secretariat Minister
Rogério Marinho Regional Development Minister
Brasília 16:45 17:00 Jorge Antonio de Oliveira Presidency Secretariat Minister
Brasília 17:00 17:20 Braga Neto Civil House Minister
Luiz Eduardo Ramos Government Secretariat Minister
Jorge Antonio de Oliveira Presidency Secretariat Minister 
Brasília 17:20 17:45 Luiz Eduardo Ramos Government Secretariat Minister
Jorge Antonio de Oliveira Presidency Secretariat Minister 
Mr. Nelson Luiz Sperle Teich
Source: Prepared by Author Based in Bolsonaro’s Daily Diary.
To find the informal presidential advisory network, four indicators are used yet. 
First, the type of meeting. Literature on institutional presidency indicates that infor-
mal advisory relationships usually occur in one-on-one and small group meetings58. 
In addition, these types of meetings have a less formalized character, without a pro-
tocol limiting the interaction between the actors59. Thus, one-on-one and small group 
meetings are considered here as an indicator of informal advisory networks mobili-
zed by presidents. 
The second indicator is the organizational affiliation of the actors who interact 
with the president in these types of meetings. This is an important aspect because it 
indicates the president's linking with actors and whether they play a legal informatio-
nal role. In Brazil, for example, ministers, presidential staff and directors of executive 
agencies have the duty to give information to the president through annual mana-
gement reports. Similarly, the leaders and vice-leaders of government in Legislature 
have agenda power and information conditions to monitor deputies60. These leaders 
are chosen by the president and generally play an informational role in aligning the 
government's agenda in the Legislature. In this way, actors inside the government 
__________________________
58.  THOMAS (1970).
59. LINK y KEGLEY (1993).
60. Powers provided by the statutory right to participate in the work of any committee and the pro-
vision to be consulted in the selection of proposals that will be considered each month (Art. 11 and 
Art. 17 of the Internal Regulations of the Chamber of Deputies of Brazil).
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have a formal advisory role, while external actors can have an informal advisory role 
in policy decision-making61.
However, not all external actors with whom the president interacts are channels 
of information for policy decision-making. The president's interaction, regarding ex-
ternal actors, can be a strategy to signal his preferences to his electoral base or his 
allies and interest groups. Thus, the third and fourth indicators are the actors' profes-
sional background and the temporal precedence of the meetings to the presidential 
decisions relative to the outstanding issues at the time, respectively. My argument is 
that both indicators mark the informational role of external actors in policy decision-
making. Thus, the informal presidential advisory network is identified through inte-
ractions established by the president with actors external to the government in one-
on-one and in small group meetings that occurred before crucial decisions making 
by the presidents.
To illustrate the point on actors' professional background, two brief examples. In a 
health emergency where decisions on measures to contain the spread of the virus are 
on everyone’s eyes, the interaction of the president in one-on-one and in small groups 
meetings with civil society actors linked to the health area is a way to access and in-
terchange the information. Similarly, in the context of an external crisis, such as the 
Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the September 11 in the US, the 
president's interactions with actors linked to the foreign policy area has been used to 
understand the caliber of information that had help the presidents make decisions62.
Finally, descriptive statistics measures and SNA tools are used for data analysis63. 
SNA has been used in an innovative way in research on informal political institutions, 
especially patronage and policy formulation in authoritarian regimes64. These studies 
show that informal institutions have a strong relational component, pointing out the 
advantages of SNA as a theoretical and empirical approach to analyze them. In addi-
tion, SNA has also been used in research on informal organizations, such as informal 
trade in developing countries65.
__________________________
61. It is important to point out that the legal informational role of government actors should be 
understood in the context of each case. In Brazil, for example, the formation of a multiparty cabinet 
with a high ideological heterogeneity, a formula adopted by Brazilian presidents to overcome the 
institutional impasses caused by the difficult combination of presidentialism and multipartyism 
MAINWARING (1993); LINZ y VALENZUELA (1994); AMORIM NETO (1994, 2006), produces 
transaction costs and constraints in controlling information about policies for presidents. In other 
words, members of the cabinet and executive agencies, being subordinate to Their parties and the 
president, have incentives to use the informational advantages they have for the benefit of their 
party at the expense of the president's preferences.
62. ALLISON (1971); PIOUS (2001); T’HART et al. (2009).
63. WASSERMAN y FAUST (1994).
64. RAZO (2008); KELLER (2015a, 2015b).
65. WALTHER (2015).
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4.1 Empirical results 
The meetings of the Brazilian president are classified in six types derived from an 
empirical observation. This is a crucial element in determining presidential access 
patterns66. These types are named as one-on-one meetings, small group meetings, 
social/ceremonial events, formal group meetings, working breakfasts/lunches and 
travel. One-on-one meetings consist of dyadic (individual) interactions between the 
president and other actors67. Small groups involve interactions between the presi-
dent and a relatively small number of actors. Social and ceremony events refer to 
official events (i.e., Inauguration Ceremony, Hoisting of the National Flag, Official 
Banquets). Finally, formal group meetings consist of the president's interaction with 
formal groups (i.e. Council of the Republic, National Defense Council). The working 
breakfasts/lunches and travel are self-explanatory68.
The President's Daily Diary presents 589 meetings of the President Bolsonaro 
from January to April 2020. Among them, 45.5% refers to one-on-one meetings and 
36.7% refers to small group meetings of average 3 actors, not including the president. 
Bolsonaro's choice for one-on-one and small group meetings differs markedly from 
the choice of ex-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who predominantly opted 
for collective meetings. However, Bolsonaro’s choice somehow resembles ex-presi-
dent Dilma Rousseff’s69. The count of one-on-one meetings of the first three years 
of Dilma’s government (2011-2013) is greater than three hundred, while Bolsonaro's 
absolute value in the first four months of his second year of government is very close 
to three hundred as table number 2 shows.
__________________________
66. LINK (2002).
67. LINK y KEGLEY (1993).
68. There is no data on each actor who interacted with the president for the last three types of meet-
ings. Formal groups usually participate in these events, such as parliamentary benches.
69. BATISTA y CAVALCANTE (2018).
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Table 2 - Percentage of Type of Meeting, Average of Time Spent by President with 
Meetings, From January to April, 2020.






One-on-One Meetings 268 45.5 37 46
Small Group Meetings 216 36.7 43 26
Social/Ceremonial 74 12.6 44 27
Formal Group Meetings 18 3.1 103 52
Working breakfasts/lunches 9 1.5 66 17
Travel 4 0.7 - -
Total 589 100.0 - -
Source: Prepared by author based on TUMELERO Database available in: https://doi.
org/10.6084/m9.figshare.14200640.
In order to examine the Brazilian president's interactions at one-on-one and small 
group meetings, all the actors were categorized in terms of their organizational affilia-
tion. This kind of information is available in the President's Daily Diary. Table number 
3 below presents the nine categories of organizational affiliation.




Cabinet CA Actors that are part of the ministries of the Execu-
tive Branch, bodies responsible for formulating 
policies.
Civil Society CS Actors who are not part of the federal, state or local 
administration or represent foreign governments.
Executive 
Agency
EA Actors that are part of the federal autarchies, that 
is, public entities with their own legal personality 
and administrative autonomy (i.e., ANVISA and the 
Central Bank of Brazil).
Foreign 
Diplomacy
FD Actors representing foreign governments.
Institutional 
Presidency
IP Actors who work in agencies that operate under 
direct presidential authority and are in charge of 
supporting the presidential leadership (MOE, 1993; 
DICKINSON, 2005; INÁCIO and LLANOS, 2016).
Judicial Branch JB Actors that make up the judicial institutions.
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LB Federal deputies, State deputies and Senators.
Local 
Government
LG Actors linked to local governments.
Subnational 
Government
SG Actors linked to subnational governments.
Source: Prepared by Author.
As figure 3 shows, in one-on-one and small group meetings, with an average last of 
37 and 43 minutes, respectively, there was a predominance of actors from the Legisla-
tive Branch and the Cabinet. On the other hand, ten civil society actors participated 
in one-on-one meetings, while twenty-nine of them interacted with the president in 
small group meetings, evidencing that the second type of meeting is the pattern of 
interaction between the president and the civil society. For the other actors, the same 
pattern of interaction occurs in both types of meetings.
Figure 3. Actors by organizational affiliation and type of meeting.
Source: Prepared by author.
A research on presidential advising points out that the frequency of interactions 
can reveal the circle of actors closest to the president and, therefore, are more central 
to the decision-making process70. Figure 4 shows that the actors with whom the presi-
dent Bolsonaro interacted most during this period are the members of the presidency 
and the cabinet. In both one-on-one and small group meetings, the frequency of in-
teraction with these two actors highly reveals that the president did not completely 
delegate the relation with cabinet ministers to the presidency units responsible for 
political coordination, such as the Government Secretariat and the Civil House. This 
measure was obtained by calculating the number of times that the name of each actor 
appears on the President's Daily Diary.
__________________________
70. LINK (2002); LINK y KEGLEY (1993).
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Figure 4. Interactions by organizational affiliation and type of meeting.
Source: Prepared by author.
In the president's interactions with cabinet members, different actors predomina-
ted in each type of meeting. In one-on-one meetings, the president interacted more 
intensively with the Justice and Public Security Minister, Sérgio Moro (CA) (15.48%), 
the Education Minister, Abraham Weintraub (CA) (13.10%) and Infrastructure Mi-
nister, Tarcísio Freitas (CA) (10.71%). In small group meetings, in turn, the Economy 
Minister, Paulo Guedes (CA) (22.56%), the Foreign Affairs Minister, Ernesto Araújo 
(CA) (14.02%), the Regional Development Minister, Rogério Marinho (CA) (7.32%) 
and the Special Advisor to the General Controller of the Union (CGU), André Men-
donça (CA) (7.32%). Except the Minister Rogério Marinho, all the others have no 
party affiliation. 
These data reveal two patterns of presidential interaction over the period: (1) fre-
quent relations with a relatively small group of seven ministers, and (2) unusual re-
lations with the Health Minister – 5.95% in one-on-one meetings and 4.27% in small 
group meetings, which is markedly low in comparison to the ministers mentioned 
above. 
In Brazil, the Health Minister is the national manager of the Sistema Único de 
Saúde (SUS), being a pivotal actor in advising the President on national public health 
policies. Besides, he is in charge of leading the national public health emergency (De-
cree 7.616/2011). Founded in 1988, by the Federal Constitution, the SUS is a universal 
publicly funded health care system that offers services of high and low complexity all 
over the country. Its management is tripartite, sharing responsibilities between the 
Union, States and Municipalities, and its bureaucracies and leaders are recruited from 
professionals and specialists from the scientific health community. This country's sta-
te capacity in public health ensures a continuous flow of information to presidents, 
which can assist them in decision making process. However, the low interaction of 
President Bolsonaro with the Health Minister indicates that this information channel 
was not very mobilized at the beginning of the pandemic. 
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Still, the frequency of the president's interactions with cabinet ministers has been 
used as an indicator of the president's pursuit to coordinate directly the formula-
tion of the legislative agenda71. Research shows a positive association between the 
interaction’s frequency of the Brazilian president with his ministers and the formu-
lation of legislative agenda aligned with the priority agenda of the president72. Thus, 
the data point out that the President has not become the Health Minister his primary 
interlocutor, as well as he did not seek to coordinate directly the MOH’s agenda to 
align it with his preferences.
The low frequency of interaction between the president and the Health Minister 
can be better understood in the context of the conflict of preferences between them. 
Since the beginning of the pandemic, both actors accumulated a series of conflicts. 
Appointed by President Bolsonaro to head the MOH during the government transi-
tion, Luiz Henrique Mandetta took office with the support of entities of the private 
health sector and the Parliamentary Health Front (FPS). When the Covid-19 outbreak 
started, he completed his first year as a minister, with the support of a team of pro-
fessionals with health management experience. Face the pandemic, the minister took 
the lead in actions to combat the spread of the virus. Still, on early February, he issued 
the Ordinance 188, 2020 declaring the ESPIN and sent to the National Congress the 
Bill of Law with sanitary measures on social distancing and quarantine, compulsory 
medical examinations and vaccination, and restriction on entering and leaving the 
country. On March 27th, he authorized the publication of the protocol for the use of 
chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine for severe cases of coronavirus73.
However, the measures taken by the minister contradicted the preferences of Pre-
sident Bolsonaro, who is an open apologist against the social distancing measures 
and the widespread use of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine for the treatment of 
non-severe cases of coronavirus. Faced to Mandetta responses, the President Bolso-
naro began to make public statements contrary to the minister's guidelines. Bolsona-
ro went so far as to say that “Mandetta wants to assert his own will very much”74. This 
intra-Executive conflict underlies the low interaction between the president and the 
minister.
__________________________
71. BATISTA y CAVALCANTE (2018).
72. BATISTA y CAVALCANTE (2018).
73. MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE. “Ministério da Saúde autoriza uso de cloroquina para casos graves de 
coronavírus”. Available in: https://www.gov.br/pt-br/noticias/saude-e-vigilancia-sanitaria/2020/03/
ministerio-da-saude-autoriza-uso-de-cloroquina-para-casos-graves-de-coronavirus [Date of ac-
cess: 05/01/2021].
74. URIBE y CANCIAN (2020): “Está faltando um pouco mais de humildade ao Mandetta, diz 
Bolsonaro sobre ministro da Saúde”. Available in: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/04/
esta-faltando-um-pouco-mais-de-humildade-ao-mandetta-diz-bolsonaro-sobre-ministro-da-sau-
de.shtml [Date of access: 30/10/2020].
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Regarding the president's interactions with members of the Presidency, almost 
the same actors predominated in each type of meeting. In one-on-one meetings, who 
present the greatest access to the president is the Presidency Secretariat Minister, 
Jorge Antônio de Oliveira (PR) (29.52%), the Government Secretariat Minister, Luiz 
Eduardo Ramos (PR) (18.10%) and the Civil House Minister, Braga Neto (PR) (15.24%). 
While in small group meetings, it is minister Luiz Eduardo Ramos (PR) (36.84%), 
again Braga Neto75 (PR) (22.04%) and the Institutional Security Office Minister, Au-
gusto Heleno (PR) (17.11%). 
The president's interactions with members of the Presidency are associated with 
the formal position they occupy76. These actors, who occupy the top of the formal 
organizational hierarchy of the Executive Branch, are responsible for providing infor-
mation to the president, for political coordination with the cabinet ministries, with 
the Legislature and the subnational governments. In addition, they are not subject to 
the dynamics of the coalition, that is, they are not indicated by the allied parties in ex-
change for legislative support for the agenda of the Executive Branch in the National 
Congress, constituting in the most loyal group to the president77.
In the president's interactions with members of the Legislative Branch, different 
actors predominated in one-on-one and in small groups meetings. In one-on-one 
meetings, the president interacted more frequently with deputies Vitor Hugo (LB) 
(17.14%), Marco Feliciano (LB) (11.43%) and Otoni de Paula (LB) (11.43%). In small 
group meetings, in turn, the most intense interactions are with deputies Fábio Faria 
(LB) (12.68%), Vitor Hugo (LB) (9.86%) and Osmar Terra (LB) (7.04%)78. Especially the 
deputy Osmar Terra is known by making public statements criticizing the MOH's 
guidelines on pandemic. Among these five deputies, four of them are leaders and vi-
ce-leaders of the government in the Legislative Branch, responsible for defending the 
Executive Branch's agenda in the Legislature and for informing the president about 
the atmosphere in that house. Deputy Fábio Faria, despite not being a leader or vice-
leader of the government, was responsible for building the president's dialogue with 
the center-right parties of the Congress during the emergency. On June 2020, Bolso-
naro appointed him to head the new Ministry of Communications.
__________________________
75. On February 18, 2020, General Braga Neto was appointed as Civil House Minister, replacing 
Minister Onyx Lorenzoni. The data classification took this fact into account. 
76. LINK (2002).
77. INÁCIO (2012, 2018). 
78. Until February 23, 2020, Osmar Terra was Minister of Citizenship, who was replaced by Minister 
Onyx Lorenzoni, and returned to his deputy term. The categorization of the data took this fact into 
account.
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In the president's interactions with actors from the Executive Agencies, the same 
actors predominated in one-on-one and in small groups meetings. In one-on-one 
meetings, the president interacts more frequently with ANVISA's director, Antônio 
Barra Torres (EA) (18.75%), with the Manaus Free Trade Zone Superintendent (SU-
FRAMA), Alfredo Menezes (EA) (12.50%), and DataPrev's director, Gustavo Canuto 
(EA) (12.50%). In small group meetings, the greatest frequency of interaction is again 
with the director of ANVISA (25.53%), with Pedro Guimarães (EA) (17.02%), presi-
dent of Caixa Econômica Federal, a public Brazilian finance institution, and Gilson 
Machado (EA) (12.77%), director of Brazilian Tourist Board (EMBRATUR).
In the president's interactions with members of the Civil Society, different actors 
predominated in each type of meeting. In one-on-one meetings, the president inte-
racted more frequently with the actress Regina Duarte (16.67%)79 and with the lawyer 
Karina Kufa (16.67%). In small group meetings, the most frequent interactions were 
again with the lawyer Karina Kufa (8.82%) and the actress Regina Duarte (5.88%), and 
also with the president of the Brazilian Medical Association (AMB), Lincoln Ferrei-
ra (5.88%), and the immunologist Nise Yamaguchi (5.88%). Figure 5 shows President 
Jair Bolsonaro's network with civil society actors. Graph A represents the president’s 
relations with civil society actors ins small group meetings, and graph B presents the 
president’s relations in one-on-one meetings. 
Both graphs reveal the pattern of interaction between President Bolsonaro and re-
presentatives of civil society, which were categorized according to their professional 
background into five categories (represented by each color). This pattern is marked 
by the greater presence of representatives of the national business sector, evangelical 
leaders and actors with different backgrounds (such as actress, soccer coach, broad-
caster and journalist). Only four representatives from the health area are part of the 
president's network, and only one of them participated in one-on-one meetings with 
the president. This pattern is also marked by the lower interaction with health actors, 
as indicated by the percentage plotted in the ties between the president and each 
actor.
The professional background of civil society actors who attended the one-on-one 
meetings shows that 40.0% of them are lawyers, 20.0% are representatives of national 
business, and 10.0% belong to the health area. Yet, among the twenty-nine actors that 
participated in small group meetings, 37.9% of them are representatives of foreign 
and national business, while only 13.8% are from the health area, as figure 5 shows.
__________________________
79. The actress was appointed as Culture Secretary on March 2, 2020, ceasing to be part of Civil So-
ciety and becoming a part of the Cabinet. The categorization of the data took this fact into account.
REVISTA CHILENA DE DERECHO Y CIENCIA POLÍTICA
JULIO 2021 •  e- ISSN 0719-2150• VOL.12 • NÚm. 1 • PágS.219-253 
242
Figure 5. Network of interactions of the Brazilian president from January to April, 
2020.
A – SMALL GROUP MEETINGS
B – ONE-ON-ONE MEETINGS
Source: Prepared by author.
TumELERO
WHO DOeS BOLSONARO LISTeN TO UNDeR emeRgeNCy CONDITIONS? BUILDINg A fRAmeWORk fOR 
ANALyzINg INfORmAL PReSIDeNTIAL ADVISORy Ne T WORkS DURINg THe COVID-19 PANDemIC IN BRAzIL
243
Graph A represents President Jair Bolsonaro's personal network (ego network) in 
small group meetings. This network has 29 actors and 34 interactions. Graph B re-
presents President Bolsonaro's personal network in one-on-one meetings, which has 
10 actors and 12 interactions. The percentages plotted on the edges represent the 
frequency of the president's interaction with each actor in each type of meeting. The 
nodes in the graphs represents each actor and each edge represents the relationship 
established between the nodes. Partial networks, such as those represented in figure 
number 5, present only the direct relations of an individual (namely ego, positioned in 
the center of the network) with his alters (that is, actors with which the ego establis-
hes direct relations). These networks reveal the patterns of interaction or sociability 
of the ego. Here, in particular, partial networks reveal the pattern of interaction bet-
ween President Bolsonaro (ego) and representatives of civil society (alters).
Among health actors, Doctors Nise Yamaguchi and Luciano Azevedo are known 
for their favorable position to the widespread use of chloroquine and hydroxychloro-
quine for the prevention and treatment of Covid-19. These actors (2020) accessed the 
president on April 6th and 7th two weeks after the publication of the protocol for the 
use of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine by the MOH, and one week before the 
resignation of Minister Mandetta. Their trajectory as researcher points up the poten-
tial informational role they played in the interactions with the president, providing a 
counterpoint to the information of the MOH on the use of the medicine. However, 
the president's first official statement in television and radio networks80 showed his 
favorable position to the widespread use of the medicine, occurred on March 24, 
twelve days before meeting these actors. Thus, these interactions better indicate a 
presidential strategy of signaling his preferences to the medical sectors that shared 
the same position on this issue.
In turn, the president of the Brazilian Medical Association (AMB), Lincoln Ferrei-
ra, interacted twice with the president Bolsonaro on April 16th, one day before the 
resignation of the Health Minister. Evidence points out that he was being quoted to 
take over the MOH replacing Mandetta, what finally did not happen. His professional 
background, especially his institutional role as a representative of the medical profes-
sionals, and the date of meetings with the president reinforces the noises about his 
appointment to head of the MOH.
__________________________
80. Available in: https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/pronunciamentos/pro-
nunciamentos-do-presidente-da-republica/pronunciamento-em-cadeia-de-radio-e-televisao-do-
senhor-presidente-da-republica-jair-bolsonaro [Date of access: 11/01/2021].
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The president of Federal Council of Medicine (CFM), Mauro Britto, interacted 
with president Bolsonaro on April 23rd, after an urgent hearing requisition with the 
objective of delivering Parecer No. 040/202081 with recommendations on the possibi-
lity of using chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine for the treatment of Covid-19. The 
entity's position was to authorize the use of the medicine for severe and mild cases 
of the disease. This meeting occurred at the height of the discussion on the use of the 
chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine in the country, but one month after the presi-
dent to defend the widespread use of the medicine in an official statement82.
The president of the Hospital Vida & Saúde, Rubens Zamberlan, interacted with 
the president on January 15th, 2020. At that time, MOH was monitoring the evolution 
of the virus in the world and starting to preparedness and response phase, as a chro-
nology of events show (Figure 2). There is no evidence that Covid-19 was under the 
president's radar of concern. Evidence also indicates that the main agenda of the mee-
ting was the invitation to the president for the inauguration of a new unit of Hospital 
Vida & Saúde in the municipality of Santa Rosa, without any relation to emergency 
measures to contain Covid-1983. 
Figure 6 shows that the health actors that attended small group meetings also inte-
racted with members of the Cabinet, the Presidency, the Legislative Branch, the Exe-
cutive Agency and the National Business. The government agents may have played a 
role as network brokers, facilitating the access of the health actors to the president.
__________________________
81. The official statement is available in: https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/
pronunciamentos/pronunciamentos-do-presidente-da-republica/pronunciamento-em-cadeia-de-
radio-e-televisao-do-senhor-presidente-da-republica-jair-bolsonaro [Date of access: 12/01/2021].
82. Available in: http://www.hvidaesaude.org.br/noticia/rubens-zamberlan-entrega-convite-para-
bolsonaro [Date of access: 10/01/2021].
83. Available in: http://www.hvidaesaude.org.br/noticia/rubens-zamberlan-entrega-convite-para-
bolsonaro [Date of access: 10/01/2021].
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Figure 6. Network of interactions of the Brazilian president health actors in small 
group meetings from January to April, 2020.
Source: Prepared by author based on TUMELERO Database available in: https://doi.
org/10.6084/m9.figshare.14200337.
Figure 6 shows the complete network of the President Bolsonaro (ego) and mem-
bers of the health sector in small group meetings. The nodes in the graphs represent 
the actors and the edges represent the relationship established between the nodes. 
Complete networks present not only the direct relations of the ego with his alters, 
but also the indirect relations of the ego produced by relations of the alters with other 
individuals that make up the relational space. Here, in particular, the alters of the 
health representatives are presented. These alters are members of the Cabinet and 
the Legislative Branch, which reveals that the government actors are intermediaries 
between the president and the members of the health area.
REVISTA CHILENA DE DERECHO Y CIENCIA POLÍTICA
JULIO 2021 •  e- ISSN 0719-2150• VOL.12 • NÚm. 1 • PágS.219-253 
246
5. Discussion
The informational scenario that surrounded the president at the beginning of the pan-
demic was pointed by four features. First, the president chose not to mobilize MOH 
as his main information channel during the crisis, despite the portfolio is in charge 
of the public health emergency management. This presidential option is reinforced 
by the records of President’s Daily Diary. From January to April (2020), the president 
interacted twelve times with the Health Minister - seven in small group meetings and 
five in one-on-one meetings – a less frequency than the interactions with the Justice 
Minister, Education Minister and Infrastructure Minister.
Second, the president used his unilateral powers to access information about the 
outbreak, centralizing in the Presidency the Crisis Committee for Supervision and 
Monitoring the Impacts of Covid-19, an advisory arrangement created in March that 
is not part of the disaster's governance structure. In addition, the president initially 
chose to compose the Committee with twenty-two representatives of the Federal Ad-
ministration, 16 of whom are representatives of the cabinet, 4 representatives of the 
Public Banks and only 2 of the health sectors. There were not representatives of civil 
society linked to the health area appointed to the Committee, which could provide 
alternative sources of information for the president.
Third, the Presidency advisory structures, especially the Civil House, the Gover-
nment Secretariat and the Presidency Secretariat, were the main informational sup-
port of the president during the emergency, playing a central role in the presidential 
advisory network. From January to April, there were 409 interactions by members 
of these structures with the president, being 304 in small group meetings and 105 in 
one-on-one meetings, while there were 248 interactions between the president and 
cabinet ministers. The centrality of these actors in the advisory network was expected 
considering that they are the most loyal contingent to the president. In addition, the 
centralization of the Crisis Committee for Supervision and Monitoring the Impacts 
of Covid-19 further strengthened the Presidency's informational capacity.
Fourth, civil society actors accessed the president during the outbreak. The analy-
sis of their professional background reveals five patterns of interaction: (1) frequent 
interactions with actors linked to national and foreign business; (2) frequent inte-
ractions with evangelical leaders; (3) frequent interactions with lawyers; and finally, 
(4) with health actors. Applying the methodological framework developed in the 4th 
section, it is not possible to say that an informal advisory network was mobilized by 
the president as a channel for transferring and exchanging information alternative to 
the MOH from January to April, 2020.
When interactions with health actors were registered in the President’s Daily 
Diary, the president’s opposition to the MOH’s recommendations was already publi-
cly known. Still, most of the health actors are known for their contrary position to the 
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social distancing measures and the protocol for the use of chloroquine and hydroxy-
chloroquine defined by the MOH. Therefore, these interactions indicate better a pre-
sidential strategy of signaling of preference to the electoral base and not an informal 
advisory strategy. They also evidence that the president did not dialogue with health 
organizations that have different position about the measures to face the outbreak.
The informational context created by the Brazilian president differs markedly from 
the context created by leaders of other countries in face of the public health emergen-
cies. The case of the H1N1 outbreak in Mexico in 2009 highlights this difference. The 
Mexican President, Felipe Calderón, chose to act in accordance with the public health 
emergency governance structure (Article 181 of Ley General de Salud), delegating to 
the Health Minister the coordination of actions to face the outbreak. Leading the 
actions, the Health Minister established a daily calendar of meetings of the Consejo 
de Salubridad General and the Consejo Nacional de Salud.  The meetings facilitated 
the coordination between all levels of government, fostering a joint decision-making 
process between government and civil society84. In other words, Calderón's informa-
tional context was marked by collegiate instances of experts, and a continuous flow of 
technical and scientific information to drive his decision making.
These findings provide evidence that contributes to understand how presidents 
of multiparty governments deal with agency losses produced by the delegation rela-
tionship. The case of Brazil reveals that the conflict of preference within the cabinet 
is not a sufficient incentive for the adoption of an informal advisory network by the 
president in the context of a national emergency. Rather, this specific context rein-
forced the president's use of his formal unilateral powers, first centralizing the Crisis 
Committee for Supervision and Monitoring the Impacts of Covid-19 in the presiden-
cy and then dismissing the Health Minister and appointing loyal personnel to head 
of the MOH.
However, it is important to ponder the findings regarding the data source of the 
study. Despite providing well documented, publicly available relational data, the Bra-
zilian President’s Daily Diary is only one piece of evidence on the informal advisory 
networks. Not all types of the president interactions - e.g., phone calls and emails 
- are registered in it. Thus, the President’s Daily Diary may not reveal all the charac-
teristics of the informal advisory network, especially all actors and interactions. To 
solve this gap, complementary data sources are needed such as in-depth interviews 
and institutional ethnography85.
__________________________
84. CÓRDOVA-VILLALOBOS et al. (2009).
85. GAINS (2011); RANKIN (2017).
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6. Conclusion
In Brazil, evidence about the existence of informal presidential advisors abounds. 
Nevertheless, research on this topic is incipient. The purpose of this article was to 
develop a conceptual and methodological framework to identify and measure it, con-
tributing to pave the way for the analysis of informal presidential advising in Latin 
America. 
First, it provides a detailed concept of informal advisory networks based in three 
analytical attributes: (1) relational choices, (2) non-regulation by legal measures and 
(3) network structure. Thus, the informal advisory strategy refers to the network of 
relationships established by the presidents with small group of actors, who are exter-
nal to government, as a means of accessing information. These interactions are not 
regulated by a legal provision and the network is constantly changing, with relations-
hips being activated and deactivated at any time.
Second, it defines four empirical indicators to measure informal networks: (1) the 
type of meeting, especially one-on-one and small group meetings; (2) the organi-
zational affiliation of the actors of network, which allows to identify the actors who 
have a formal advisory role and those whose advisory role is informal; (3) the actors' 
professional background, which indicates the potential capacity of actors to provide 
information on policy making; and (4) the temporal precedence of meetings regar-
ding the decisions and positions adopted by the presidents.
This conceptual and methodological framework is applied to a case study of Brazi-
lian president interactions in the first four months of the Covid-19 outbreak. This pe-
riod was marked by the intra-executive conflict between the presidency and MOH - 
portfolio in charge of public health emergency management - and it covers decisions 
of national importance on topics related to the pandemic, such as social distancing 
measures and the protocol for the use of chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine. The 
President’s Daily Diary was used as source of evidence.
The findings reveal the informational scenario in which the Brazilian president 
was embedded during the emergency. The scenario was marked by three features. 
First, the choice of president by-passes the MOH as his main information channel, 
despite the portfolio being in charge of public health emergency management and 
leading responses to the outbreak from the beginning. Second, the president's option 
to use the structures of the Presidency as the main informational support - especially 
Civil House, the Government Secretariat and the Presidency Secretariat - besides 
strengthening its informational capacity through the centralization of a Crisis Com-
mittee. Third, his choice by not combining formal and informal advisory as the stra-
tegy to access information alternative to MOH.
However, it is important to ponder these findings regarding the data source of 
the study. Provoked by this case there is one main lesson for the analysis of informal 
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advisory networks. President’s Daily Diary may not reveal all the interactions of pre-
sidents and as a result, it may omit the real existence of informal advisory networks. 
To solve this data gap, it is important to collect complementary data by in-depth 
fieldwork techniques.
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